Sounding the alarm : government of The Republic of Namibia v LM and women's rights during childbirth in South Africa. by Pickles,  Camilla
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
03 October 2019
Version of attached ﬁle:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Pickles, Camilla (2018) 'Sounding the alarm : government of The Republic of Namibia v LM and women's
rights during childbirth in South Africa.', Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, 21 . pp. 1-34.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2018/v21i0a4303
Publisher's copyright statement:
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
C PICKLES  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM [2014] NASC 19 
(hereafter the LM case) concerns the involuntary sterilisation of 
women during childbirth. The Supreme Court of Namibia found that 
obtaining consent during the height of labour is inappropriate 
because labouring women lack the capacity to consent because of 
the intensity of their labour pains. This article recognises that the 
LM case may make its way into current litigation strategies against 
involuntary sterilisations in South Africa and for this reason I 
evaluate the soundness of the court's reasoning in the LM case. I 
argue that the court relied on the harmful gender stereotype that 
labouring women lack the capacity to make decisions, I expose this 
stereotype as baseless and demonstrate the harmful 
consequences of its perpetuation. Finally, I demonstrate why the 
reasoning in the LM case is particularly problematic in the South 
African context, and I conclude that the adoption of this sort of 
reasoning will result in many women facing serious injustices, 
because it strikes at the core of a woman's agency during childbirth. 
Keywords 
Involuntary sterilisation; childbirth; informed consent; capacity; 
obstetric violence; human rights. 
………………………………………………………. 
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1 Introduction 
Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM1 (hereafter the LM case) 
concerns a claim for damages arising out of the involuntary sterilisations 
performed on three women during childbirth. The Supreme Court of Namibia 
found that obtaining consent for sterilisation procedures during the height of 
labour is inappropriate because women lack the capacity to provide consent 
during this time as a result of their experiencing labour pains.2 The court 
recognised that sterilising women without their informed consent violates their 
rights to found a family, their dignity and their bodily integrity.3 
The LM case has been identified as the first of its kind in sub-Saharan Africa, 
and the judgment is considered to be significant because there is similar 
litigation taking place in other parts of Africa, including South Africa.4 The LM 
case therefore sets the tone for subsequent litigation concerning involuntary 
sterilisation and women's reproductive healthcare rights more generally. Badul 
and Strode understand this case to be a victory for patients' rights and view it 
as adding to existing patient protections.5 They assert that the LM case adds 
to the current body of law relevant to informed consent because it requires the 
information provided to the patient to be recorded and because it recognises 
that obtaining consent during labour does not promote patient autonomy, since 
decisions tend to be rushed in those circumstances.6 Kangaunde and Tucker 
view this judgment as affirming the reproductive rights of women.7 Nair 
suggests that litigation on this issue is an important step towards recognising 
the reproductive rights of HIV-positive women, that it may encourage a shift in 
state policies, and that it may increase respect for reproductive choices more 
generally.8 
At first glance, LM seems to affirm the rights of the affected women. Moving 
beyond the narrow context of involuntary sterilisation, this judgment may be 
                                            
  Camilla Pickles. LLB, LLM, LLD (UP). British Academy Postdoctoral Research Fellow, 
Department of Law, University of Oxford. Research Fellow, South African Institute for 
Advanced Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and International Law (SAIFAC), 
University of Johannesburg, South Africa. E-mail: camilla.pickles@gmail.com. 
1  Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM [2014] NASC 19 (hereafter LM case). 
2  LM case paras 107-108, 110. 
3  LM case para 3. Unfortunately, the court did not make an explicit declaration that the 
women's rights were violated as a result of being involuntarily sterilised. 
4  Badul and Strode 2013 AHRLJ 216. 
5  Badul and Strode 2013 AHRLJ 223. 
6  Badul and Strode 2013 AHRLJ 223. 
7  See Kangaunde and Tucker date unknown http://www.womenslinkworldwide.org/files/ 
gjo_summary_caseLMandOthersvNamibia_en.pdf. 
8  Nair 2010 Harv Hum Rts J 231. 
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the first of its kind in southern Africa to consider women's medical decision-
making powers during childbirth. The doctrine of informed consent9 is 
unquestionably applicable to all areas of medical treatment, but how the 
doctrine applies to the specificities of different areas of medical treatment is 
still being determined, and childbirth is one of those untouched areas. From 
this perspective, the LM case could be described as ground-breaking because 
Namibia's highest court has confirmed that women have the final say regarding 
their non-emergency treatment during childbirth, irrespective of what 
healthcare providers determine to be in their best interests.10 However, I argue 
that worrying facets of the court's reasoning have been overlooked and this 
oversight may lie in the fact that the sterilisations were found to be unlawful 
and the affected women could proceed with their damages claim. 
The purpose of this article is to move beyond the successful claim for damages 
and expose the harmful precedent that the LM case sets in the context of 
women's rights during childbirth. First the article will look at what the court 
decided and how it came to reach that decision, in terms of the evidence it 
accepted and the authority it relied on. The article then "sounds the alarm" in 
three respects: It highlights some missing links within the court's reasoning; it 
reveals the court's harmful gender stereotyping of women during childbirth by 
portraying them as incompetent11 decision-makers at this time; and it 
contemplates some of the harmful ripple effects we should expect if the 
reasoning in the LM case is applied to the context of childbirth more generally. 
The article goes on to explore why the LM case is a South African issue and I 
argue that litigators and judicial officers in South Africa should guard against 
the reasoning in the LM case because of its flawed reasoning. 
                                            
9  According to Van Oosten there is no valid consent unless the patient knows and 
appreciates what he or she is consenting to. Knowledge and appreciation can only be 
achieved if the attending healthcare provider furnishes him or her with the appropriate 
knowledge. Appropriate and adequate knowledge about the proposed treatment 
becomes a requisite of knowledge and appreciation and thus a requisite of lawful 
consent. This places a legal duty on healthcare providers to impart necessary 
knowledge so as to enable a patient to make a decision concerning his or her treatment. 
The doctrine of informed consent protects and promotes patient autonomy and the 
rights to bodily and psychological integrity. See Van Oosten Doctrine of Informed 
Consent 447-448. See para 2 below for a more detailed discussion. 
10  The court emphasised that its position regarding patients having a final say over 
treatment does not extend to emergency medical treatment; see LM case para 106.  
11  Incapacity and incompetence and capacity and competence are used interchangeably 
in this article. Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 879 explain that "capacity 
… refers to competence which refers to the functional ability to meet the demands of 
specific decision-making situations". 
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2  Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM 
Three women living with HIV were sterilised after undergoing caesarean 
sections in public healthcare facilities.12 The women instituted civil action 
against the Namibian state, arguing that their sterilisations were unlawful 
because the procedures were performed without their informed consent.13 The 
High Court of Namibia found in favour of the three women.14 It held that the 
women did not provide their informed consent for the sterilisation procedures 
and the sterilisations were therefore unlawful.15 The state appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Namibia. 
The Supreme Court of Namibia considered the circumstances surrounding the 
sterilisation of the three women. It recognised that the women had not gone to 
hospital for the purpose of being sterilised but to give birth to their babies, that 
signed consent was obtained while the women were in labour or when being 
taken to theatre for the purpose of performing caesarean sections, and that 
there was no documentation of the nature of the information provided when 
the women's signatures were acquired so as to ensure that their consent was 
informed.16 The court also turned to South African case law, Christian Lawyers 
Association v Minister of Health17 (hereafter Christian Lawyers Association 
case) and Castell v De Greef,18 (hereafter Castell case) for direction regarding 
the notion of informed consent and the important role it plays in relation to 
protecting patient autonomy while accessing healthcare. 
                                            
12  LM case para 1. 
13  The women also instituted a second claim arguing that their sterilisations were a result 
of them being HIV positive, and that their sterilisations thus constituted a wrongful and 
an unlawful practise of "impermissible discrimination". However, both the High Court 
and Supreme Court rejected this claim and as a result thereof this issue will not be 
considered in this article. For a critique of the court's finding in relation to the alleged 
discriminatory practice, see Badul and Strode 2013 AHRLJ 224-227; Patel 2017 Public 
Health Rev 15. 
14  LM v Government of the Republic of Namibia [2012] NAHC 211 (hereafter LM HC case). 
15  LM HC case para 80. 
16  LM case paras 100-102. 
17  Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 2005 1 SA 509 (T) (hereafter 
Christian Lawyers Association case). The Christian Lawyers Association case confirms 
that girls under the age of 18 years' have the right to decide to terminate their 
pregnancies in terms of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 if they 
have the required capacity to provide informed consent. 
18  Castell v De Greef 1994 4 SA 408 (C) (hereafter Castell case). The Castell case rejects 
medical paternalism and provides that the right to self-determination places an 
obligation on healthcare providers to obtain a patient's informed consent before 
providing treatment. 
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In the Christian Lawyers Association case, the then Transvaal Provincial 
Division confirmed that informed consent 
forms the basis of the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria that justifies conduct that 
would otherwise have constituted a delict or crime if it took place without the 
victim's informed consent.19 
In the context of medical treatment, treatment will constitute a violation of a 
patient's right to privacy and personal integrity if it is provided without the 
patient's informed consent.20 Adding to this, informed consent was found to 
rest on three pillars: knowledge, appreciation and consent.21 "Knowledge" 
concerns full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk associated with 
the treatment.22 "Appreciation" means that the patient should comprehend and 
understand the nature and extent of the harm or risk.23 "Consent" requires that 
the patient should subjectively provide comprehensive consent, meaning that 
consent must be in relation to the entire course of treatment, including its 
consequences.24 
The Supreme Court of Namibia accepted that in order for the patient's consent 
to be valid, the patient must have the capacity to consent.25 According to the 
Christian Lawyers Association case, "capacity to consent" refers to the 
intellectual and emotional ability of the patient to comprehend and understand 
the nature of any proposed treatment and the consequences thereof.26 The 
Supreme Court of Namibia interpreted this as suggesting that 
it is crucial for us to determine whether the respondents had the intellectual and 
emotional capacity to give their informed consent in the light of the peculiar 
circumstances in which they found themselves when signing the consent forms.27 
The court then accepted that the women's states of mind at the time of their 
signing the sterilisation consent forms, were affected by their labour pains and 
                                            
19  Christian Lawyers Association case 515D. 
20  Christian Lawyers Association case 515D-E. 
21  Christian Lawyers Association case 515F. 
22  Christian Lawyers Association case 515H. 
23  Christian Lawyers Association case 515H. 
24  Christian Lawyers Association case 516A. 
25  LM case para 99. 
26  Christian Lawyers Association case 516B. 
27  LM case para 100. It is noteworthy that the Christian Lawyers Association case did not 
consider the girl's capacity "in the light of particular circumstances" or the impact 
circumstances may have on her ability to make a decision. The court was primarily 
concerned with the emotional and intellectual maturity of girls to make abortion-related 
decisions. 
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certain medical complications which necessitated urgent caesarean 
sections.28 
After noting that some of the healthcare providers testified that sterilisation was 
the best option available to the women concerned,29 the court turned to the 
Castell case for direction in relation the position of medical paternalism30 in 
contemporary societies. In the Castell case the court accepted that medical 
paternalism is based on outdated patriarchal attitudes and, in the context of 
medical treatment, the notion of patient autonomy conforms to human rights 
and individual freedom.31 Fundamental to patient autonomy is the principle of 
self-determination, which means that the patient decides whether to consent 
to, or refuse, medical treatment.32 
The Supreme Court found that the doctrine of informed consent recognises 
that the patient has the final say, and given that sterilisation procedures are 
not emergency procedures, sufficient time should be allocated for informed 
and considered decision-making.33 
The court applied the principles extracted from the case law to the 
circumstances of the women's sterilisations and found that the women had not 
given their informed consent. Despite the fact that most of the LM case is 
dedicated to evidence that suggests that the women were not given sufficient 
information about sterilisation so as to be able to provide valid, informed 
consent, the court narrowly focussed on the women's capacity, being their 
emotional and intellectual ability, to comprehend the information being given 
at the time. The court's position on capacity during labour is as follows:34 
The consent obtained was invalidated by the respondents' lack of capacity to give 
informed consent in light of the history of how the decision to sterilise them was 
arrived at and the circumstances under which the respondents' consent was 
obtained. It was merely written rather than informed consent. … The important 
factor which must be kept in mind at all times is whether the woman has the 
capacity to give her consent for sterilisation at the time she is requested to sign 
                                            
28  LM case para 102. 
29  LM case paras 103, 104. 
30  Tan explains that medical paternalism concerns the healthcare provider's "prerogative 
to act on his or her own best judgment for the patient" and that maximum patient benefit 
can only be achieved when the attending healthcare provider makes the final decision 
for the patient. Under medical paternalism, the focus is on health outcomes rather than 
the patient's needs and rights. See Tan 2002 Singapore Med J 148. 
31  Castell case 422H. The court quotes from Van Oosten Doctrine of Informed Consent. 
32  Castell case 422H-I. 
33  LM case para 107. It is worth noting that, in principle, contraceptive sterilisations are not 
classified as emergency procedures and therefore cannot be imposed as a therapeutic 
necessity. See WHO 2014 http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/ 
112848/1/9789241507325_eng.pdf?ua=1 14. 
34  LM case para 108. 
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consent forms. Therefore, it is not decisive what information was given to her 
during antenatal care classes or at the moment she signed the consent form if 
she is not capable of fully comprehending the information or making a decision 
without any undue influence caused by the pain she is experiencing. 
The court found that the consent provided was invalidated by the fact that none 
of the women had the capacity to provide informed consent. 
3  Sounding the alarm 
Some of the initial responses to it have been positive, but the LM case 
essentially finds that women who experience labour pains lack the capacity to 
give informed consent, and this cannot and should not be overlooked. Even 
though the court made this finding in respect of the three women affected, it 
can have quite broad application because it uses labour pains to deny 
capacity, and labour pains are something that most women will face during 
childbirth.35 Further, this finding can also have far reaching implications for all 
women in childbirth. If labouring or birthing people do not have the capacity to 
give consent during labour, by implication they will not have the capacity to 
refuse consent or withdraw a prior refusal or consent either. Given the 
potentially extreme implications of this judgment, a critical analysis of the 
judgment and the court's process is necessary. 
3.1  Missing links 
The finding of the Supreme Court is rather startling given that the capacity of 
the women to provide informed consent was not raised as an issue. The issue 
was whether the information provided was sufficient to allow the women to 
make an informed decision regarding their sterilisation.36 The High Court 
accepted that seeking consent during the height of labour was inappropriate 
but the court ultimately found that the state had failed to discharge its onus to 
prove that the women had been provided with sufficient information to render 
their consent informed.37 The high court's finding did not rest on the capacity 
of the women but on the fact that there was no record of the information 
provided to the women when obtaining their signatures on the relevant consent 
forms.38 
                                            
35  Given the highly medicalised process childbirth has become, obstetric interventions are 
the norm rather than the exception and the right to refuse treatment is a crucial right to 
protect when confronted with an interventionist environment. See Burrows 2012 Techné 
31. 
36  LM HC case paras 3-6. 
37  LM HC case paras 69, 71, 77, 80. 
38  LM HC case paras 68, 70, 73. 
C PICKLES  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  8 
Going further, the approach of the Supreme Court towards capacity during 
childbirth does not resonate with the approach adopted in factually comparable 
involuntary sterilisation matters before international fora. The Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the European Court of 
Human Rights have each heard cases regarding the involuntary sterilisations 
of women or girls who consented to their sterilisations while in labour or while 
in theatre for the purpose of childbirth by way of caesarean section.39 In these 
instances, the court or committee found that the sterilisations were a violation 
of a number of human rights, because the procedures were performed without 
informed consent in so far as the information provided was insufficient to 
render the women informed. 
In the AS case the applicant presented at hospital in labour, feeling very dizzy, 
bleeding more heavily than average, and in a state of shock; and she signed 
her consent form while in theatre.40 In this instance the committee focused on 
the obligation to provide timely and comprehensive information and 
counselling regarding sterilisation.41 It did not take the position that the 
applicant's childbirth experiences (pain and complications) removed her 
capacity to provide consent. 
The VC case is the second factually similar case. Here, the applicant attended 
hospital after the onset of labour and the issue of consent for sterilisation was 
raised by attending healthcare providers when the applicant was in the last 
stages of labour.42 Even though the applicant was on the verge of giving birth 
and was recognised to be in extreme pain,43 the European Court of Human 
Rights found her to be a mentally competent adult patient whose informed 
consent had to be obtained prior to the performance of a non-emergency 
medical procedure.44 Having regard to the applicant's medical record, the court 
found that the applicant had not been fully informed about her health status, 
the proposed sterilisation procedure or possible treatment alternatives.45 
Further, the action of asking for consent after the applicant had been in labour 
for hours and just before the birth denied the applicant the time necessary to 
consider all the relevant issues and to discuss the matter with her partner.46 
                                            
39  AS v Hungary Com No 4 2004 (CEDAW C/36/D/4/2004, 29 August 2009) (hereafter AS 
case); VC v Slovakia App No 18968/07 (ECtHR, 8 November 2011) (hereafter VC case). 
40  AS case para 2.2. 
41  AS case para 11.3. 
42  VC case paras 12, 15. 
43  VC case para 15. 
44  VC case para 110. 
45  VC case para 112. 
46  VC case para 112. 
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In each of the above cases the various applicants were experiencing labour 
pains and facing health complications during labour or childbirth, and the court 
or committee never questioned the capacity of the applicants to provide 
informed consent on these grounds.47 
The approach adopted by international fora is in line with the generally 
accepted and applied presumption that an adult is presumed to be competent 
unless there is evidence indicating otherwise. This presumption can be found 
in the common law, legislation, case law and guidelines for healthcare 
professionals.48 Thus, the approach of the international community is in line 
with medical practice. In this regard, Appelbaum explains that when assessing 
the competency of a patient to provide consent 
examiners should first ensure that patients have been given the information that 
is relevant to making an informed decision about their treatment.49 
This suggests that capacity cannot be questioned without first exploring the 
information provided to the patient. When it becomes apparent that capacity is 
in question because the patient is unable to understand and weigh the 
information provided, the patient should be individually assessed by the 
treating healthcare provider, psychiatrist or psychologist, and that assessment 
should serve as evidence regarding capacity at the relevant time.50 
                                            
47  NB v Slovakia App No 29518/10 (ECtHR, 12 June 2012) is one exception. The applicant 
was experiencing labour pains but she was sedated in preparation for childbirth by way 
of caesarean section, and then asked to sign her sterilisation consent form. In this 
instance, the ECtHR accepted that the applicant lacked the capacity to provide consent 
because of the effects of sedation and not on the basis of labour pains or childbirth-
related complications. 
48  See Heaton South African Law of Persons 36; Himonga "Persons and Family" 146-147. 
A manifestation of this presumption can be found in South African criminal law and law 
of succession case law: see S v Els 1993 1 SACR 723 (O); Geldenhuys v Borman 1990 
1 SA 161 (E). For the Namibian context, see S v Hangue 2016 JDR 0044 (NmS); S v 
Rickerts 2016 JDR 0442 (Nm). Also see the HPCSA 2008 
http://www.hpcsa.co.za/downloads/conduct_ethics/rules/generic_ethical_rules/booklet
_9_informed_consent.pdf 7. An example of a legislative expression of this presumption 
can be found in s 1(2) of the English Mental Capacity Act, 2005; it states that a "person 
must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that he [or she] lacks 
capacity". In the context of forced obstetric interventions on pregnant women in 
England, see Re T [1992] EWCA Civ 18; Re MB [1997] EWCA Civ 3093. See Donnelly 
2007 JSIJ 141 for a more general application of the presumption of capacity in the 
United Kingdom and Skegg 2011 U Queensland LJ 165 for a critique of the presumption 
of capacity. 
49  Appelbaum 2007 N Engl J Med 1837. Also see Brooks and Sullivan 2002 Int J Obstet 
Anesth 198. 
50  See Ladd 1989 Hypatia 41; Cahill 1999 Nursing Ethics 499; Appelbaum 2007 N Engl J 
Med 1834; Nicholas and Nicholas 2010 TOG 30-31. 
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Against this backdrop, it is necessary to consider what the Supreme Court 
relied on to reach the conclusion that the affected women lacked the capacity 
to provide informed consent. The judgment itself reveals that very little 
evidence was considered in relation to the impact of labour on the capacity to 
provide informed consent. The court accepted the expert evidence of one 
specialist gynaecologist and obstetrician, Dr Kimberg, according to whom:51 
[D]uring labour a woman might experience pain of such a level and intensity that 
she loses a sense of reality; she may stop thinking rationally. A woman may be 
aware only of the pain, and may 'grasp at straws' to be relieved of such 
discomfort. … consent should not be obtained from women in circumstances 
when they are experiencing so much pain. According to him, many women in the 
height of labour say that they would not choose to experience the pain of 
childbirth again, yet many still return with a pregnancy the following year. 
The court weighed Dr Kimberg's evidence against the evidence presented by 
the state's witnesses and found that the state's evidence did not challenge Dr 
Kimberg's position.52 On this basis, the court concluded that the women's 
consent was invalidated by the fact that they lacked the capacity to give 
informed consent  
none of the respondents gave informed consent because they were in varying 
degrees of labour and may not have fully and rationally comprehended the 
consequences of giving consent for the sterilisation procedure.53 
The Court gave preference to Dr Kimberg's evidence, which is far too 
generalised and could be described as a one-sided description of the impact 
of labour pain on women and on their capacities when experiencing that pain. 
The evidence implies that all women have the same response to labour pain 
and certain complications during childbirth. The court disregarded the 
evidence of the nurses who attended the applicants during their labour. 
Snippets of the nurses' testimonies suggest that a nuanced and individualised 
approach should be adopted when considering the capacity of the affected 
women to give their consent while experiencing labour pain. For example, a 
nurse testified that labour pains "come and go", that there are different types 
of labour pains during the labour process, and that she would explain 
procedures and obtain consent in between contractions.54 Another nurse 
testified that she would not speak to patients while they were experiencing 
labour pains, and that she knew when contractions were severe and when they 
were not.55 An attending medical officer in the Department of Obstetrics and 
                                            
51  LM case para 24. 
52  LM case para 102. 
53  LM case para 109. 
54  LM case paras 43, 51. 
55  LM case para 54. 
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Gynaecology, where one of the applicants was sterilised, testified that pain 
was a "subjective matter" and 
all women are in pain during labour but that this consideration alone did not 
render them incapable of giving their informed consent.56 
There was no evidence, at least as recognised in the judgment, which 
meaningfully sets out the individual circumstances of the women or their 
individual responses to labour pains. That is, the women's voices in relation to 
their personally perceived ability to provide informed consent while in labour is 
notably absent from the judgment.57 All the women implicated are separate 
individuals and they may have perceptions and responses to circumstances 
different from those of other women as a result of their having different life 
experiences.58 Further, there was no appropriate expert evidence before the 
court, or at least none recognised in the judgment, which provided objective, 
professional assessments of the three women's mental states when consent 
was provided.59 
In view of the existence of these gaps, it is difficult to accept that an 
obstetrician's general perceptions of women in labour should stand as 
evidence applicable to all three of the women. In effect, the court has given the 
force and authority of law to a generalised perception of labouring women 
without the foundation of objective evidence specific to each woman, or without 
relying on any established judicial precedent. From this perspective, it can be 
                                            
56  LM case paras 61, 63. 
57  Two applicants reportedly had different responses to pain, the judgment briefly alludes 
to the fact that the second respondent testified that she was in too much pain to inform 
her doctor that she did not want to be sterilised and that the third respondent wanted 
her pain to be eased, see LM case paras 17, 20. However, needing pain relief or feeling 
unable to speak at a certain point during labour does not indicate a lack of capacity. 
According to the Christian Lawyers Association case 516B, the test for capacity 
concerns the emotional and intellectual ability to form a particular will. 
58  For example, all women had different experiences with previous pregnancies and 
childbirths. The first applicant was 26 at the time, it was her third pregnancy and the two 
previous childbirths were vaginal births, see LM HC case para 20. The second 
respondent's age is unknown, but she previously gave birth to three children, two of 
which were via caesarean-section procedures, see LM HC case para 22. The third 
respondent was 46 years old at the time of the incident and she was giving birth to her 
eighth child, six of her deliveries were vaginal births, see LM HC case para 23. 
According to Ladd, these experiences may change women's responses to pain during 
labour, see Ladd 1989 Hypatia 41. Going further, there is scholarship which suggests 
that some women have positive experiences in relation to labour pain and describe it 
as empowering, fulfilling and creative, see generally Cohen Shabot 2017 Eur J Women 
Stud 128. This scholarship emphasises the need for an individualised approach to 
women in labour. 
59  Appropriate expert evidence would be evidence provided by a psychiatrist or 
psychologist, not a gynaecologist. See generally Donnelly 2007 JSIJ 141. 
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argued that the court relied on and perpetuated a particular stereotype of 
women in labour. 
3.2  Stereotyping women 
A stereotype can be defined as a 
generalized view or preconception of attributes or characteristics possessed by 
… members of a particular group, such as women. Irrespective of individuals' 
personalities, capacities or qualities, those perceived as members of the groups 
are regarded as possessing characteristics that are typical of that group.60 
Cook and Cusack explain that a  
finding that a law, policy or practice stereotypes women, hinges on the existence 
of a generalised view or preconception concerning the attributes or 
characteristics that are possessed by women 
without having regard to the individuality of the people concerned.61 Further, 
the authors explain that there are several indicators that help reveal 
circumstances when a stereotype is being applied. These include selective 
interpretation or an extreme evaluation or judgment based on limited 
evidence.62 
Cusack and Cook identify three stereotypes of women that emerge in the 
context of female reproductive healthcare.63 Women are stereotyped as being 
primarily mothers and this stereotype prescribes that women should prioritise 
childbearing and childrearing over all other possible roles.64 Women are 
stereotyped as being weak and vulnerable and this infers that women are in 
need of third-party protection.65 Women are stereotyped as incompetent 
decision-makers, which implies that they are irrational, that they lack the 
capacity for agency, that they are incapable of making difficult decisions, or 
that they are prone to regretting decisions made.66 It is the final stereotype, 
                                            
60  See Cook, Cusack and Dickens 2010 Int J Gynaecol Obstet 255. See also Gillmor 2000 
Int J Childbirth Educ 8; Cusack and Cook 2009 JCRSJ 49-55. 
61  Cook and Cusack Gender Stereotyping 45. 
62  Cook and Cusack Gender Stereotyping 47. 
63  Cusack and Cook 2009 JCRSJ 55-56. 
64  Cusack and Cook 2009 JCRSJ 55. 
65  Cusack and Cook 2009 JCRSJ 55, 66. Protection is afforded via restrictive laws, 
practices or policies which work to limit access to healthcare services such as certain 
late-term abortion procedures or by requiring attending healthcare providers to 
protectively approve women's decisions to undergo abortions. See Halliday Autonomy 
and Pregnancy 52; Cook, Cusack and Dickens 2010 Int J Gynaecol Obstet 256; 
Bonnington et al Contraception 443. 
66  Cusack and Cook 2009 JCRSJ 56; Cook, Cusack and Dickens 2010 Int J Gynaecol 
Obstet 256. For instance, in the context of court-ordered obstetric interventions, women 
have been found to be irrational for refusing medically-advised interventions, and 
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that women are incompetent decision-makers, which is relevant for the 
purpose of this article's assessment of the LM case. 
Stereotyping women as incompetent decision-makers is particularly prevalent 
in the context of medical decision-making during childbirth in so far as it is 
assumed that women lack the capacity to make medical decisions as a result 
of their experiencing labour pains. Examples of how this stereotype plays out 
in women's lives can be found in case law, obstetric practice and research, 
and scholarly publications. 
In Norfolk and Norwich Healthcare (NHS) Trust v W67 (hereafter Norfolk), W 
was on the verge of giving birth but was in a state of arrested labour, and she 
refused to undergo medically-advised obstetric interventions to assist her 
during childbirth. Her healthcare provider sought an order authorising the use 
of forceps or caesarean section surgery, despite her refusals. The court found 
that W 
lacked the mental competence to make a decision about the treatment that was 
proposed because she was incapable of weighing up the considerations that 
were involved. She was called upon to make that decision at a time of acute 
emotional stress and physical pain in the ordinary course of labour.68 
The same approach was followed in the Rochdale Healthcare case,69 where 
the court found that C was rendered incapable of making a valid decision 
regarding the birth of her child because of the pain and emotional stress 
associated with her labour. Both cases found that there was no expert 
evidence to support a finding that C and W were incapable of making medical 
decisions. 
If the courts in the above matters did not have evidence establishing that the 
women lacked capacity, one must ask what the courts relied on to reach such 
                                            
"irrationally" refusing treatment was taken to indicate a lack of capacity; see Dickens 
and Cook 2015 Int J Gynaecol Obstet 107; Halliday Autonomy and Pregnancy 40-92. 
In Rochdale Healthcare (NHS) Trust v C [1997] 1 FCR 274 275G-H (hereafter Rochdale 
Healthcare case), in response to the patient's preference of death over experiencing 
another caesarean section, the court found: "[A] patient who could … speak in terms 
which seemed to accept the inevitability of her own death, was not a patient who was 
able to properly weigh-up the considerations that arose so as to make any valid 
decision, about anything of even the most trivial kind, surely still less one which involved 
her own life." The court reached this decision despite the attending obstetrician being 
of the opinion that the patient was competent and no psychiatric evidence was provided 
to indicate otherwise. The court found that the patient lacked capacity to refuse consent 
and that performing a caesarean section would be in her best interests. 
67  Norfolk and Norwich Healthcare (NHS) Trust v W (1996) 34 BMLR 16 (hereafter Norfolk 
case). 
68  Norfolk case 19. 
69  Rochdale Healthcare case 275G. 
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extreme conclusions. In this regard Wei argues that the courts relied on a long-
standing general assumption of women’s incompetence during labour and 
childbirth.70 Ladd and Flanigan's scholarship on informed consent during 
labour highlights the pervasive belief held by healthcare providers that the 
emotional stress of pain impairs a labouring woman's cognitive and rational 
ability to understand and appreciate the information provided by attending 
healthcare providers.71 This assumption is "pervasive" to the extent that it has 
made its way into professional journal articles and published books, which 
advise healthcare providers to obtain consent for possible procedures prior to 
the onset of labour.72 For example, midwives have been advised that consent 
should be obtained during the antenatal period, since labour pain and anxiety 
"are likely to detract from the woman's ability to make informed choices".73 
The assumption that labouring women lack capacity during labour and 
childbirth has clearly shaped how consent is obtained in obstetric practice. 
Frequently women are required to sign general consent forms upon their 
admission into hospital or prior to the onset of their labour for a range of 
procedures that may not be necessary at the time of admission.74 Furthermore, 
women are encouraged to complete and submit birth plans.75 These methods 
of obtaining consent reinforce the assumption that women lack the capacity to 
make medical decisions during labour and childbirth.76 Cahill argues:77 
The implicit message is that, while women may be deemed competent at the time 
they complete the [birth] plan, at the onset of labour and delivery they will no 
longer be so. 
Her interpretation is supported by reports of the refusal by attending healthcare 
providers to accede to a woman's change of mind regarding care or 
                                            
70  Wei 2016 Legal Issues 89. Also see Cahill 1999 Nursing Ethics 499. 
71  Ladd 1989 Hypatia 40-41; Flanigan 2016 Ethical Theory Moral Pract 228. 
72  See those sources cited by Ladd 1989 Hypatia 37; Cahill 1999 Nursing Ethics 501. 
73  As quoted in Cahill 1999 Nursing Ethics 501. This advice would not be problematic if it 
emphasised that midwives should approach each woman on an individual basis instead 
of advancing a blanket approach which presumes incapacity. 
74  See Ladd 1989 Hypatia 37. 
75  Lothian explains that a birth plan is a formal written plan drafted by pregnant women 
which expresses and clarifies their desires and expectations regarding care during 
childbirth. The plan helps women communicate with their healthcare providers. See 
Lothain 2006 JOGNN 296. Regarding encouraging women to complete birth plans, see 
Nicholas and Nicholas 2010 TOG 30. 
76  Cahill 1999 Nursing Ethics 501; Ladd 1989 Hypatia 38. 
77  Cahill 1999 Nursing Ethics 501. 
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interventions during labour or childbirth in instances where a birth plan is in 
place.78 
Medical research too is shaped by the assumption that women lack the 
capacity to provide informed consent during labour and childbirth. Reid et al79 
note the widely held concern that 
it is unclear whether women in labour are capable of giving fully informed consent 
for research as they need to be capable of rational decisions when provided with 
full and relevant information. The act of giving birth, including the influence of pain 
during labour, may significantly inhibit rational decision-making with respect to 
patient involvement. 
Reid et al reveal a preference for obtaining consent prior to the onset of labour, 
and one respondent in their study emphasised that his or her committee would 
insist on prospective consent in all cases.80 This respondent's position was 
based on concerns regarding the capacity of women to consent during 
labour.81 
Relying on a stereotype may not in itself necessarily be problematic. In fact, 
Cook, Cusack and Dickens accept that generalisations of highly complex 
issues can be helpful and the use of stereotypes can offer a measure of 
predictability and security.82 Nevertheless, the authors caution that 
stereotyping can be harmful when stereotypes, which are based on flawed 
perceptions or ill-founded presumptions, are applied in ways that result in 
exclusion and disadvantage. 
Women are frequently disadvantaged and harmed by the application and 
enforcement of certain stereotypes.83 Stereotypes that harm, disadvantage 
and unlawfully discriminate84 against women are those that confine women to 
                                            
78  Brooks and Sullivan 2002 Int J Obstet Anesth 200; Thornton and Moore 1995 Int J 
Obstet Anesth. 
79  Reid et al 2011 Aust N Z J Obstet Gynaecol 485. 
80  Reid et al 2011 Aust N Z J Obstet Gynaecol 487. 
81  Reid et al 2011 Aust N Z J Obstet Gynaecol 487. As a consequence of this approach, 
labouring women are routinely excluded from clinical trials and this hampers the 
development of improved clinical care during childbirth. 
82  See Cook, Cusack and Dickens 2010 Int J Gynaecol Obstet 256. Also see Cusack and 
Cook 2009 JCRSJ 51. 
83  Cook, Cusack and Dickens 2010 Int J Gynaecol Obstet 255. 
84  Cook, Cusack and Dickens explain that stereotyping may be unlawful because the 
"[d]isadvantage that individuals suffer due to treatment different from that afforded 
others from whom they are not materially different constitutes discrimination. Women 
are materially different from men due to physique and reproductive functions, but not in 
their capacity for moral reflection or understanding of information, or, for instance, their 
right to self-determination. Accordingly, when men can receive health services without 
government or state intervention, but women have to satisfy stereotypical legislated, 
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certain gendered roles, prescribe what women can or cannot do, and ignore 
women's individual characters, abilities, needs, desires and circumstances in 
ways that deny them their rights.85 
According to Cook, Cusack and Dickens, stereotyping women as incompetent 
decision-makers within the realms of reproductive care has far-reaching 
consequences because the stereotype is used to deny women reproductive 
self-determination and moral agency, it infantilises them and justifies surrogate 
decision-making.86 Going further, the harms associated with the blanket 
assumption of incapacity during childbirth must be dismantled because this 
approach cannot be justified. It is now being revealed that this stereotype lacks 
an evidential foundation. 
During the 1970s and 1980s empirical research suggested that emotional 
stress and pain had the effect of impairing a person's ability to understand and 
appreciate information, thus offering a measure of support for the 
generalisation that women experiencing labour pains lack the capacity to 
provide informed consent.87 However, recent empirical research debunks 
these earlier findings and find that a generalised view that a person will lack 
the capacity to consent as a result of pain can no longer be supported.88 
Casarett, Karlawish and Hirschman find that there is no relationship between 
pain and decision-making capacity.89 Instead, they find that factors such as 
age, education and literacy have the potential to undermine decisional capacity 
                                            
customary or other criteria inapplicable to men, women suffer discrimination, and this is 
liable to be unlawful." See Cook, Cusack and Dickens 2010 Int J Gynaecol Obstet 257. 
85  Cook, Cusack and Dickens 2010 Int J Gynaecol Obstet 255; Cusack and Cook 2009 
JCRSJ 51-52. For instance, the stereotype that women are primarily mothers is used to 
deny many women access to emergency contraception or family planning information, 
and prevents access to safe and lawful termination-of-pregnancy services. See Cusack 
and Cook 2009 JCRSJ 56-65. This stereotype is also found in England's forced 
caesarean-section judgments where obstetric care is imposed on the basis that giving 
birth to a live baby is in the woman's best interests, see Norfolk case 19; Bolton 
Hospitals NHS Trust v O [2003] 1 FLR 824 827; Re L (1996) 35 BMLR 44; Tameside & 
Glossop Acute Services Trust v CH [1996] 1 FLR 762 773. Also, in the context 
stereotyping women as vulnerable and thus in need of protection from difficult and 
"regrettable" decisions, Cook, Cusack and Dickens 2010 Int J Gynaecol Obstet 255 
demonstrate how the United States Supreme Court judges, in Gonzales v Carhart 550 
US 124 (2007) relied on this stereotype to justify upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act, 2003. This Act denies women access to a particular late-term abortion 
procedure which may be medically indicated at times. For a further critique of this 
approach, see Siegel 2008 Duke LJ 1641. 
86  Cook, Cusack and Dickens 2010 Int J Gynaecol Obstet 257. 
87  See the discussion of this evidence in Ladd 1989 Hypatia 40-41. 
88  See Casarett, Karlawish and Hirschman 2003 J Pain Symptom Manage 615. 
89  Casarett, Karlawish and Hirschman 2003 J Pain Symptom Manage 621. 
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in so far as these factors may impact on the ability of patients to understand 
information provided.90 
While Casarett, Karlawish and Hirschman's research concerns patients living 
with cancer, the same results emanate from studies examining labouring 
women's ability to provide informed consent for epidural analgesia.91 This 
empirical research is particularly helpful because informed consent must be 
provided for epidural analgesia92 and in these studies the participants provided 
consent after the onset of labour and while they were experiencing labour 
pains, presumably when they could no longer endure the pain associated with 
labour. 
Gerancher et al demonstrate that women are able to engage in the informed 
consent process despite being in active labour and this finding is aligned with 
the labouring women's self-perception that they were able to give informed 
consent.93 Jackson et al find that the ability to understand risks is not affected 
by labour pain, the duration of labour pain, anxiety, or the desire for an 
epidural, and they conclude that 
labouring patients are as able to give informed consent as are other members of 
our patient population.94 
In fact, Jackson et al argue that the informed consent process can be truly 
complete only once women are in labour and fully experiencing labour and 
childbirth: 
It is arguable that only during labour when the severity of pain has been realized 
and the consequence of continuing without intervention becomes clear, can the 
informed consent process be complete.95  
Also, Gerancher et al suggest that 
labouring women may be more likely than patients with illness or elderly 
volunteers to be attentive to the consent process because they feel empowered 
to make decisions 
                                            
90  Casarett, Karlawish and Hirschman 2003 J Pain Symptom Manage 621. 
91  Gerancher et al 2000 Int J Obstet Anesth 168; Jackson et al 2000 Can J Anesth 1068. 
Broaddus and Chandrasekhar 2011 Anesth Analg 912 explain that these studies test 
whether women could recall the information provided to them while they were in labour. 
The authors explain that methodology effectively assesses the measure of absorption 
and understanding of information. 
92  Jackson et al 2000 Can J Anesth 1069. 
93  Gerancher et al 2000 Int J Obstet Anesth 168. 
94  Jackson et al 2000 Can J Anesth 1068. 
95  Jackson et al 2000 Can J Anesth 1071. 
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and many pregnant women may possess baseline medical knowledge relevant 
to labour and childbirth, thus rendering informed decision-making realisable 
during labour.96 Flanigan97 and Ladd98 reveal that baseline knowledge may 
originate from antenatal care and/or from previous pregnancies and 
childbirths.99 
The findings considered here do not support the assertion that all women who 
experience labour pains will always enjoy full capacity to provide informed 
consent. Gerancher et al and Jackson et al also identified a small group of 
women as being unable to provide informed consent because of the pain of 
labour.100 However, the findings emphasise that current empirical research 
does not support a blanket presumption of the incapacity of labouring women. 
Therefore, the stereotype that women are incompetent medical decision-
makers during childbirth lacks an evidentiary foundation and cannot be relied 
on to justify denying labouring women their agency and rights to reproductive 
self-determination and dignity, among other rights. 
3.3  Harms of Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM 
It is clear that the LM judgment relies on and perpetuates a stereotype 
proffered by a healthcare provider, Dr Kimberg. The labouring women were 
found to be incompetent decision-makers on the basis of experiencing labour 
pains during childbirth. This is a generalised view of women in labour and the 
court's position is based on extremely limited evidence. 
While stereotyping and relying on stereotypes are not inherently problematic, 
in this instance, stereotyping may be extremely harmful. At first glance the 
potential harm is difficult to appreciate because the affected women's claims 
against the state were successful. However, what makes the court’s position 
problematic is the fact that it portrays all women who share characteristics 
comparable to those of the three women in the LM case as lacking the capacity 
                                            
96  Jackson et al 2000 Can J Anesth 1072. 
97  Flanigan 2016 Ethical Theory Moral Pract 230. 
98  Ladd 1989 Hypatia 41. 
99  However, these arguments assume that access to antenatal care is universal, that all 
relevant information will be provided, and that women have laboured and previously 
experienced childbirth in a hospital environment. It is necessary to explore how baseline 
knowledge can be acquired through traditional knowledge and whether those relying on 
this form of knowledge render them less capable of providing informed consent in a 
highly medicalised birth setting. 
100  See Gerancher et al 2000 Int J Obstet Anesth 170; Jackson et al 2000 Can J Anesth 
1071 respectively. 
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to provide consent as a result of their experiencing labour pains.101 Not only is 
this position not supported by emerging empirical research (as discussed 
above) but it also denies women in childbirth their reproductive rights. These 
rights include the rights to equality, self-determination, dignity and bodily 
integrity, and the right to be free from violence within the context of 
reproductive healthcare.102 Stereotyping women as incompetent decisions-
makers lays the foundation for infantilising them, enables surrogate decision 
making, and effectively dismantles patient autonomy and all that it protects. 
Maintaining the right to self-determination during childbirth is important for a 
number of reasons. There is an increase in the prevalence of routine clinical 
and technological management of childbirth103 such as foetal monitoring, 
episiotomies and labour induction, and framing an intervention as "routine" 
causes women to be burdened with the responsibility of refusing interventions 
rather than burdening healthcare professionals with the obligation to obtain 
valid, informed consent.104 This approach pressurises or impairs women's 
autonomy, and presuming incapacity would exacerbate this worrying trend. 
Compounding this issue is the emerging discourse that a refusal to undergo 
treatment requires the possession of a higher degree of capacity because of 
the possible harmful consequences that may materialise in cases where an 
intervention does not occur.105 Also, women may change their minds during 
childbirth and may wish to withdraw either their consent or their prior refusal,106 
and the right to do so will be denied in cases where women are presumed to 
lack the capacity to make informed decisions while experiencing labour pains 
during childbirth. 
Going further, the LM case is problematic because it characterises the issue 
of involuntary sterilisation as an inadequacy on part of the affected women. 
                                            
101  See Cusack and Cook 2009 JCRSJ 74 regarding the ripple effect of applied 
stereotypes. 
102  See ss 9, 10 and 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter 
Constitution). 
103  This approach has links to the employment of "defensive medicine", see Johanson, 
Newburn and Macfarlane 2002 BMJ 892. Defensive medicine occurs when medical 
practitioners perform procedures to avoid exposure to malpractice litigation, see Sekhar 
and Vyas 2013 Ann Med Health Sci Res 295. 
104  See generally Burrows 2012 Techné 36-38; Glennon "Regulation of Reproductive 
Decision-Making" 152-153. Glennon reveals how healthcare professionals, within the 
context of assisted reproduction, are able to influence patients' decision-making by 
making use of default rules which very few patients contest because of their default 
status. 
105  Dickens and Cook 2015 Int J Gynaecol Obstet 105. 
106  Withdrawal of consent or prior refusal is likely to happen because women are only truly 
informed once they are in the position to experience the process of childbirth, see 
Jackson et al 2000 Can J Anesth 1071. 
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The sterilisations were found to be unlawful because of a flaw found within the 
three women: that each of them lacked the capacity to provide consent 
because of the pain of their labour. By adopting this approach, the court 
removed its focus from the healthcare professionals and their questionable 
practice of obtaining consent for non-therapeutic procedures during labour and 
childbirth. The flaw in this case does not lie with the women who are giving 
birth but with the healthcare professionals who obtain consent without 
providing adequate information and without providing adequate time for 
labouring patients to consider their reproductive health options. The 
sterilisations were involuntary and unlawful because the affected women were 
never provided with adequate information regarding sterilisation as a means 
of contraception. We cannot fault women's capacity to comprehend and 
understand information if they were never given the information to start with. 
From this perspective it can be argued that the LM case does not advance 
labouring patients' rights, nor does it promote or protect women's reproductive 
rights. Further, it does not encourage respect for reproductive choices because 
it creates an environment where a woman's choice will be denied if she 
attempts to exercise that choice while in the throes of labour. The reasoning in 
the judgment effectively lays the foundation for the violation of women's rights 
during childbirth. A judgment that advances patient autonomy, reproductive 
rights and respect for reproductive choices would have focussed on and 
clarified the healthcare profession's obligations in relation to the provision of 
the correct information for the purpose of contraceptive sterilisation and 
confirmed and applied labouring women's rights to self-determination and 
reproductive autonomy. Instead, the LM case embeds into Namibian law the 
stereotype that labouring women are incompetent decision-makers while they 
are experiencing labour pains, and it sets a precedent which will be hard to 
overturn, given that this judgment comes from Namibia's highest court. 
4  Government of the Republic of Namibia v LM as a South 
African concern 
In South Africa the scope of reproductive rights is still being determined, and 
to date the focus of legislation and litigation has been limited concerns relating 
to the avoidance of becoming a parent107 and surrogacy.108 As a result of this 
                                            
107  See the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996; Sterilisation Act 44 of 
1998; Christian Lawyers Association of SA v Minister of Health 1998 4 SA 1113 (T); 
Christian Lawyers Association case. 
108  See ch 19 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005; AB v Minister of Social Development 2016 
2 SA 27 (GP); AB v Minister of Social Development 2017 3 SA 570 (CC). 
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very narrow focus, South Africa has not fully explored how the Bill of Rights 
applies to people during childbirth.109 However, this is set to change. 
Recently, reports have revealed that HIV-positive women living in South Africa 
have been sterilised without their informed consent.110 In these instances it has 
been argued that consent was invalid because it was not informed and was 
provided while the women were in the throes of labour or on the verge of giving 
birth by way of caesarean section. Litigation has commenced for some of the 
affected women.111 While this litigation is concerned with the lawfulness of the 
sterilisation procedures, it also opens the door to a consideration of the broader 
issue of reproductive rights in childbirth, and it is at this juncture that the LM 
case and its potentially harmful effect becomes relevant to South Africa. 
Aside from the fact that section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution permits the 
consideration of foreign law when interpreting the rights in the Bill of Rights, 
there are strong and exact indications that the LM case may make its way into 
current litigation strategies against involuntary sterilisations in South Africa. 
The LM case has been framed as advancing reproductive and patient rights, it 
is the first sub-Saharan African case of its kind which addresses an issue that 
impacts on women in South Africa, those supporting its outcome have roots in 
South Africa and are involved in the South African involuntary sterilisation 
investigations,112 and LM relied on South African case law to reach its 
outcome. 
At first glance the LM case demonstrates the potential of South African 
abortion113 and medical negligence114 case law to advance reproductive rights 
and the rights of obstetric patients in relation to obtaining consent for elective 
procedures during childbirth. However, the reasoning in the LM case 
contradicts and possibly erodes the very principles advanced in the Castell 
and Christian Lawyers Association cases. 
                                            
109  This concern is not unique to South Africa. To date, there is no international or regional 
instrument which establishes or demonstrates how human rights apply to the context of 
childbirth. See Murphy 2009 Ave Maria L Rev 443; Spence 2012 Cardozo JL & Gender 
101 for scholarship calling for increased attention to this issue. 
110  See Strode, Mthembu and Essack 2012 RHM 61; Essack and Strode 2012 Agenda 24. 
111  According to Strode, one matter was settled out of court and two or three matters are 
before the high courts, e-mail from Ann Strode on 11 January 2016. 
112  See Badul and Strode 2013 AHRLJ 215. At the time of writing, Badul is the Director of 
the University of KwaZulu Natal's Law Clinic and Strode is a Senior Lecturer at the same 
institution. Their co-authored article suggests a way forward in relation to litigating 
against involuntary sterilisation after the LM case. 
113  Christian Lawyers Association case. 
114  Castell case. 
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The Castell case found that informed consent is based on the right to self-
determination and patient autonomy. These rights oblige doctors to take a 
patient-orientated approach when determining what information should be 
provided for the purpose of obtaining valid consent, and it is for the patient to 
determine whether to undergo any proposed treatment.115 Relying on Castell, 
the Christian Lawyers Association case found that the first leg of the informed 
consent process is the provision of relevant information to the patient. The 
second leg concerns the patient’s ability to appreciate and understand the 
information provided. This implies that one cannot claim that a patient lacks 
the ability to understand and comprehend the nature of a proposed treatment 
without first offering the information to the patient.116 The LM case not only 
sidestepped the issue of the obligations of a healthcare provider in relation to 
providing adequate and appropriate information, but it also put the horse 
before the cart in so far as it attacked a woman's capacity to understand 
information without having regard to the information that should have been 
provided. On this point, LM concludes:117 
Therefore, it is not decisive what information was given to her during antenatal 
classes or at the moment she signed the consent form if she is not capable of 
fully comprehending the information. 
The LM case paves the way for dismantling birthing women's rights to 
information, and in doing so it diminishes women's rights to self-determination 
and their autonomy as patients. Further, the application of the LM case in 
South African litigation strategies may inadvertently open the door to medical 
paternalism, which is the very issue that the Castel and Christian Lawyers 
Association cases stand against. 
More generally, the LM case is problematic within a South African setting 
because South Africa itself is struggling to develop jurisprudence that is 
removed from stereotypes relating to gender, gender roles, female 
vulnerability and sexuality. According to Albertyn, the Constitutional Court is 
yet to meaningfully give effect to the right to equality in a way that transforms 
and dismantles gender stereotypes, norms and structures that create and 
                                            
115  Castell case 420G-J, 426E. 
116  This approach is in line with the approach adopted in relation to the clinical assessment 
for capacity. The clinical assessment approach accepts that capacity is "function 
specific" in that a patient may have capacity to consent for one medical intervention but 
lack the capacity to consent to another, and it is only through the assessment of a 
patient's ability to comprehend and understand the information being conveyed that 
capacity can be established, if in doubt. See Appelbaum 2007 N Engl J Med 1837; 
Nicholas and Nicholas 2010 TOG 30; Hope 2005 Medicine 5. 
117  LM case para 108. 
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perpetuate certain inequalities in society.118 In this respect, Albertyn 
distinguishes between equality judgments that increased inclusion and those 
that result in transformation.119 She explains that an inclusive approach to 
equality 
broadens the umbrella of social recognition, but does not address the structural 
conditions that create and perpetuate systemic inequalities.120 
An approach that secures transformation should work to dismantle power 
relations, stereotypes and dominant norms that supress, subordinate and 
maintain inequality.121 
After analysing four Constitutional Court equality judgments,122 Albertyn 
effectively demonstrates that the Constitutional Court has been unable to 
move beyond dominant norms and existing stereotypes and restructure the 
systems that create the privileged positions upon which inequality thrives.123 
She argues that the transformative potential of the judgments is hindered in 
part by their reliance on and application of stereotypes about gender and 
sexuality.124 For instance, in the Hugo case125 the Constitutional Court failed 
to meaningfully recognise that men may also be single parents with childcare 
responsibilities comparable to those of some women. She argues that the 
court was unable to do so because it focussed on the stereotype that women 
fill the role of mother and primary care-provider, and thereby entrenched 
stereotypical gender roles.126 In the Masiya case127 the court's reliance on the 
stereotype that women are vulnerable and need protection contributed towards 
                                            
118  Albertyn 2007 SAJHR 253. 
119  Albertyn 2007 SAJHR 256. 
120  Albertyn 2007 SAJHR 256. 
121  Albertyn 2007 SAJHR 256. 
122  President of the Republic of Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) 
(hereafter Hugo case); S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC); Volks v Robinson 2005 5 BCLR 
446 (CC); Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 5 SA 30 (CC) (hereafter 
Masiya case). 
123  Albertyn 2007 SAJHR 261-270. This is not to say that parties were left without remedies 
but that the remedies were ineffective in facilitating transformation. For instance, with 
reference to cases concerning the right to equality and sexual orientation, the court's 
remedial approach is to include gay and lesbian populations into existing institutions 
and norms rather than dismantling those norms and institutions that created the 
framework for exclusion. 
124  For a further discussion, see Albertyn 2007 SAJHR 261-264. 
125  In the Hugo case the Constitutional Court found that granting special remission of 
sentences to only mothers and not fathers with minor children under age of 12 years 
did not unfairly discriminated against single fathers. 
126  Albertyn 2007 SAJHR 261-264. 
127  In the Masiya case the Constitutional Court developed the common law definition of 
rape to include anal penetration of a woman but did not go so far as to include 
unconsented anal penetration of men. 
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a finding that the crime of rape should not be extended to include the rape of 
men. Albertyn stresses the concern that South African courts are susceptible 
to the hidden influences of stereotypes and that they maintain a position of 
conformity to dominant norms and privileging structures which institutionalises 
stereotypes rather than challenges or dismantles them. 
The general support and positive reception of the LM case and the 
environment of the persistent application of stereotypes by the South African 
judiciary makes this case particularly worrying in the context of the current 
quality of the healthcare provided during childbirth in South Africa. The 
involuntary sterilisation of women during childbirth is an example of the 
broader issue of obstetric violence.128 One of the many recognised forms of 
obstetric violence is obstetric intervention during childbirth without informed 
consent,129 which practice pervades obstetric care in South Africa.130 
Even though the broader issue of obstetric violence during childbirth has not 
made its way to the courts in South Africa, it might, and the LM case could be 
particularly harmful if it were relied on by parties while litigating against 
involuntary sterilisations. Of further concern is the fact that the LM case may 
be well received by judges when hearing involuntary sterilisation cases, thus 
making it a real possibility that the stereotype that women lack the capacity to 
provide informed consent as a result of labour pains may be entrenched in our 
law. Creating such an unfavourable and potentially harmful precedent could 
jeopardise the opportunity to develop the law in a way that dismantles the 
norms, stereotypes and broader structures that promote and perpetuate 
                                            
128  Obstetric violence is recognised as a form of gender-based violence which can occur at 
an institutional level and a personal level. In Venezuela, art 15 of the Organic Law on 
the Right of Women to a Life Free from Violence, 2007 recognises obstetric violence as 
a form of violence that health personnel inflict on pregnant and birthing people. It defines 
it as the appropriation of the body and reproductive processes of women by health 
personnel which causes a loss of autonomy and the ability to decide freely about their 
bodies and sexuality, negatively impacting the quality of life of women. See D'Gregorio 
2010 Int J Gynaecol Obstet 201. 
129  Other examples of obstetric violence include physical, psychological and verbal abuse, 
humiliation, shouting, scolding, and crude and aggressive attacks on women's sexuality, 
performing clitordectomies and virginity inspections where consent is socially coerced 
and deliberate refusal of pain relief. See Pickles 2015 SAQC 6-7 and authority cited 
therein. 
130  Jewkes, Abrahams and Mvo 1998 Soc Sci Med 1786; Farrell and Pattinson 2004 SAMJ 
896; Kruger and Schoombee 2010 J Reprod Infant Psychol 94-97; Human Rights Watch 
2011 https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/sawrd0811webwcover.pdf 24, 29-
34; Chadwick, Cooper and Harries 2014 Midwifery 865; Chadwick 2014 Afr J Midwifery 
Women's Health 177; Honikman, Fawcus and Meintjes 2015 SAMJ 284, Hastings, Nolte 
and Temane 2017 Women and Birth (in press). 
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obstetric violence in South Africa.131 Thus, relying on the reasoning in the LM 
case to support women's compensation claims for involuntary sterilisation may 
come at the price of sacrificing all women's reproductive rights during 
childbirth, and would do little to challenge the status quo, which enables the 
perpetuation of obstetric violence against women during childbirth. 
5  Conclusion 
In a society where women are still establishing their autonomous space for 
agency and substantive equality that results in transformation within obstetric 
care, it is counter-intuitive to support the LM case and encourage its application 
to reproductive health issues in Namibia, South Africa, or elsewhere. This 
article demonstrates that the LM case relies on and perpetuates the stereotype 
that women are incompetent decision makers during childbirth. The application 
of this stereotype harms and discriminates against women in childbirth since it 
functions to deny them their right to reproductive self-determination. It also fails 
to protect and promote reproductive rights more broadly, and it treats birthing 
women differently within the context of the requirement of informed consent. 
All of this occurs without considering the individuality of women and without 
the support of adequate evidence. 
South Africa is still determining how the Bill of Rights applies in the context of 
childbirth. There is no legislation giving content to human rights relevant to 
pregnancy, labour or birth, there is very little litigation on human rights issues 
during childbirth, and there is little academic commentary. In this context the 
LM case could have a fairly negative impact on the development of the 
foundation necessary for the effective promotion and protection of women's 
rights during childbirth and obstetric care in South Africa. Securing 
compensation for involuntary treatment should not cost women their rights 
during childbirth and should never be based on harmful stereotypes. Those 
developing litigation strategies and judicial officers should be cautious of the 
reasoning in the LM judgment and should actively guard against perpetuating 
harmful stereotypes of women in childbirth. 
                                            
131  This claim is linked to the argument that obstetric violence is a product of broader social 
inequalities linked to gender. For instance, Dixon, in relation to the Mexican experience 
of overcoming obstetric violence argues that the obstetric violence movement "positions 
specific obstetric practices within a broader framework of historical and ongoing patterns 
of social inequality, especially related to gender, race, and class. How women are 
treated in labor and birth ... mirrors how they are treated in society in general. For many 
midwives, this means that women are set up from the beginning to be treated poorly in 
public hospitals—because of their status as lower class and/or indigenous". Dixon 2015 
Med Anthropol Q 447. 
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